Adding a system access control list (SACL) In the properties of Audit Directory Service Changes policy, Configure the following audit events option, both checkboxes ( Success and Failure ) should be ticked. When in Group Policy Management Editor, navigate to ( and expand policies ) Computer Configuration, then Windows Settings then Advanced Policy Configuration and click DS Access.Īmong the other subcategories, there will be Audit Directory Service Changes. The operation should be done from a server, or a workstation with Remote Server Administration Tools (RSAT) installed.īy opening Group Policy Management, and expanding Active Directory Forest, Domains, and then the Domain Controllers Organizational Unit (OU), access to Default Domain Controllers Policy GPO is granted, and by right-clicking Edit from the menu, Group policy management editor will open. It has to be done on the domain controller, on a way to change Group policy object, Default Domain Controllers Policy. The first step is enabling auditing of Active Directory service changes. Enable auditing of Active Directory service changes If some example organization works in three shifts, with different server administrators, and, in meantime permissions on some Active Directory objects, change, overnight, it is the good practice to know which admin ,and when changed it.įor that information, auditing for changes to permissions on Active Directory should be enabled, and in this article, we will explain how to do it successfully. Let’s start an article, with a small example : IT administrators should typically have a low-level user account used for everyday activities, and only use a domain admin account when needed to carry out special server operations or other required activities.This articles describes how to track permissions changes in Active Directory. However, this is a dangerous approach from a security perspective.Īs a security best practice, even senior IT administrators who may legitimately need domain admin-level access, should not use this account for general day-to-day operations. ![]() This provides an easy way to ensure they can carry out tasks they may need, such as password resets. Often, helpdesk technicians and other IT staff are placed in the domain admins Active Directory group. With a domain admin account, an attacker has permissions to access just about any system or data on the network. Specifically, in Active Directory, this is known as a Domain Admin. The holy grail of account compromise is for an attacker to compromise an admin account. If an attacker compromises your account credentials, you want the “blast radius” of the security compromise to be as minimal as possible. However, to design security properly, you have to plan for compromise at some point. ![]() In a perfect world, you want to have zero security compromises of your accounts. In that case, the attacker now has an account with far more capabilities than if it was provisioned correctly with least privilege access. ![]() Suppose an attacker compromises an end-user account with overprovisioned permissions (more than needed). Often, attackers who look to compromise an environment do so using compromised credentials. Let’s consider why the least privilege access model is essential in provisioning permissions, even for IT helpdesk staff. Least privilege access – why vital for security?
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